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Abstract. 
Although households are responsible for many important decisions, they have rarely 
been the subject of economics experiments. We conduct a series of linked and 
incentivized experiments on decision-making, designed to see if the anomalies typically 
found in individual choice experiments are found when the subjects are couples from 
long-term relationships. Specifically we investigate the endowment effect, the 
compromise effect, asymmetric dominance and the ‘more is less’ phenomena. 
Comparing the results with two control groups (students and non-student individuals) 
we find broadly the same pattern of anomalies in individuals as we do in couples. Thus 
behavioural patterns that appear in individual choices appear relevant for decisions made 
by established couples. 
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Introduction. 
One large portion of the experiments on individual decision-making has been devoted to 
examining the robustness of the standard models of individual choice. To truncate a huge and 
ongoing endeavour into a few words: while results continue to attract controversy, a significant 
number of experiments have found anomalies – i.e. deviations from the predictions of rational 
choice models.  This paper reports an experiment designed to test for anomalies in the choice 
behaviour of established couples, married and unmarried. A simple motivation is that the 
majority of adults actually live with other adults, typically in some form of long-term 
relationship. Yet despite the importance of multi-person households, there is actually very little 
experimental evidence on decisions made by natural groups such as couples. Perhaps they do not 
behave in a similar manner to individuals. 
Before moving on it is worth stating that in this paper the word ‘anomaly’ is used without 
its usual connotation of irrationality. With individual decisions, choice models often have clear 
predictions about what is rational and what is not. An anomaly is then a systematic deviation 
from rational behaviour. With collective choice, as in the household, behaviour depends on the 
preferences of the individuals and on the nature of the game that is played between them. Since 
the exact structure of the latter is often not observable, conclusions about rationality or its 
absence are harder to obtain.1 Here, for want of a better word, we use the term anomaly as 
 
 The work reported here was financed by the UK’s ESRC, grant no. RES-000-22-2081.  
1 For instance, the endowment effect is usually interpreted as evidence against the rational choice 
model. In the context of two person bargaining, to avoid protracted disputes players might use the 
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shorthand for ‘behaviour such that if it was observed within individual choice  it would be 
typically be interpreted as a deviation from rational choice’. 
A specific reason for investigating household choices lies in attempts by behavioural 
researchers to link experimental data with that drawn from the field - for instance, the Benartzi 
and Thaler, 1995, explanation of the familiar equity premium paradox. Since identification of 
anomalies from non-experimental data is problematic, usually the empirical strategy is to show 
that the field data is consistent with the chosen anomaly and then to rule out other possible 
explanations as far as is possible. A basic problem with such a strategy is that many decisions in 
the real world are made jointly, by couples (or by a household) and not individually as in the 
laboratory, or even in typical field experiments. Thus the researchers are trying to tie field data 
generated from the collective decisions of households to results gleaned from individual choice 
experiments. There is therefore a missing link in the chain of evidence: experimental tests of 
decisions made by couples. We aim to narrow the gap between field and laboratory, by reporting 
an experiment on couples living together in established relationships. Because there is an almost 
complete lack of findings on the topic we test for several effects in one experiment. Our aim 
therefore is not to probe the detailed factors which determine the strength or causes of particular 
anomalies. Rather it is to provide broad-brush evidence on a topic, which though important, 
currently lacks data.2 
status quo as the default choice if no Pareto improvement upon it is possible. It is hard to label 
‘irrational’ an endowment effect caused by such a bargaining rule.   
2 In fact, although there are now some good experiments on group decision-making in an 
economic context, there is little evidence on anomalies in group choice.  
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In the experiment we compare the behaviour of couples to individuals with similar 
backgrounds to the couples (hereafter labelled individuals) and to undergraduate students. Our 
results are basically that couples exhibit anomalies in more or less the same way as the non-
couples. In other words, there is no evidence that two heads are better than one; nor is there any 
evidence that being in a couple makes anomalous choices more likely. 
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows: in the next section we provide a brief 
background to the experiment and consider the relevant literature. In section 3, we describe the 
experimental procedure with results presented in the following section. Section 5 concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. Background and Design. 
There are a few economic experiments which examine household decision-making.3 
Bateman and Munro (2005) use established couples as subjects and test some core theories of the 
household, while Peters et al, 2004, conduct a voluntary contributions game using family and 
non-family groups. Iversen et al, 2006, uses a game of voluntary contributions in Uganda to see if 
partners maximize the surplus available to the household as a whole. Meanwhile, Ashraf , 2005, 
conducts an experiment using Filipino couples, testing whether the savings decisions of 
household members is affected by the transparency of their choices, while Carlsson et al, 2009, 
study the relative power of Chinese spouses in joint decisions. Out of these papers only Bateman 
                                                 
3 There is a longer, but intermittent tradition of experiments on couples within marketing science 
(e.g. the interesting study by Corfman and Lehmann, 1987). Experiments in this line are rarely 
incentivized and the focus has not been on testing economic models.  
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and Munro (2005) tests a standard choice model.4 The paper rejects expected utility theory for 
the household, finding the same Allais-type behaviour in joint decisions as have become the norm 
in individual decision-making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
While household-based experiment are rare, in the last 10 years there have been a number 
of significant experiments on group decision-making in economics (e.g. Blinder and Morgan, 
2005 or Kocher and Sutter 2005), typically using groups assembled for the purpose of the 
experiment. The emphasis of many of these experiments has largely been on demonstrative, 
intellective tasks (Laughlin, 1982) – i.e. situations where there is a clear normative principle for 
picking one option rather than another and where once someone in the group has had a ‘eureka’ 
moment and explained the solution to others, it is readily accepted. In these situations, in non-
economics experiments groups usually perform better than individuals (e.g. Argot et al, 1990 for 
Bayes Theorem). In experiments with economic incentives similar results have been obtained. 
Blinder and Morgan, 2005 for instance find that groups outperform individuals, while Kocher and 
Sutter, 2005 conclude that groups learn faster than individuals and outperform them in turns of 
earnings.5 A smaller set of papers has considered deviations from standard models of choice 
within group decision-making. Bone, Suckling and Hey, 1999, for instance find that groups of 
two individuals deviate from expected utility theory in a manner similar to individuals.  More 
recently, Sutter 2007 produces evidence that myopic loss aversion is present in group decision-
making but weaker compared to that found in individual decisions. Meanwhile Charness et al, 
 
4 Whether deviation from expected utility represents an anomaly as defined above is of course 
disputed. See Loomes and Sugden, 1982 for one view that expected utility theory represents ‘an 
unnecessarily restrictive notion of rationality’ p.820.  
5 Groups also seem to coordinate more successfully, compared to individuals. E.g  
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2007 show that groups are less likely to violate first order stochastic monotonicity and Bayes 
Theorem compared to individuals, but that behaviour is not completely anomaly-free even in 
groups of three. 
The relevance of this group decision-making literature for household decisions is not 
clear. Obviously couples are an example of a two person group but they differ from the typical 
experimental group in a number of fairly specific ways. Fundamentally, the partners are not 
thrown together for the purposes of the experiment – they have a prior ongoing relationship. 
Conceivably, this may make couples more uninhibited in their discussions compared to decisions 
made by groups of strangers. On the other hand, the couple’s relationship also continues after the 
experiment ends, which suggests that in making decisions couples may well have regard to the 
long-run effects of the manner of their discussions and the way in which any disagreements are 
resolved. This may make one person hesitate to point out the stupidity of a partner’s mistakes. 
Alternatively it may give partners reasons to be clear in their reasoning. Third, the members of a 
household are typically bound together by emotions (of love and altruism) rather than say 
economic circumstances. This may not just affect the ranking of different options, but also affect 
the way in which disputes are avoided and resolved (Messick 1999). In short therefore, the rules 
that govern decision-making and interaction within couples might be rather different to those 
between partners in a financial relationship or in a situation where it is not important to 
demonstrate commitment and affection. This point is often stressed in the social psychological 
literature on relationships (Morton, 1978, Clark and Grote, 2003) and it suggests there is no clear 
theoretical reason why, first, couples’ decisions should resemble those made by experimental 
groups and secondly no compelling argument why anomalies should be stronger or weaker within 
couples compared to individuals.  
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We therefore wish to conduct an experiment to offer some direct evidence on the issue. 
We explore four kinds of anomalies commonly found in (riskless) individual choice experiments. 
All of them involve manipulations of the frame in which choices are made. They were picked on 
the basis of their simplicity, their familiarity to us and their relevance to choices made regularly 
in markets by households and individuals. 
 
1. Endowment effect. In standard models of the consumer, preferences are not related to 
endowments. Hence the proportion of individuals who prefer bundle A to bundle B when 
randomly endowed with A should be equal to the proportion who prefer A to B when 
endowed with B. Since pioneering work by Knetsch and Sinden, 1984, the endowment 
effect has become a standard laboratory anomaly (e.g. Bateman et al, 1997), especially in 
single shot experiments. In field experiments (e.g. List, 2003) and repeated choice  its 
status is more disputed, but to date it has been found in over 100 experiments and field 
settings (Munro, 2009). 
2. Compromise effect. A compromise effect occurs in the context of comparisons between 
choices made from two sets of goods, {A,B} and {A,B,C} Simonson, 1989. Like the 
endowment effect, it is commonly found in individual choice experiments with or without 
incentives (e.g. Herne, 1999). In the choice set, B is chosen to be a convex combination 
of A and C. A strong compromise effect occurs if the probability B is chosen is higher 
when C is present in the choice set. The strong effect is a rejection of the notion of 
complete preferences since it implies that for some decision-makers, the ranking of A 
versus B depends on the presence or absence of option C. A weak compromise effect 
occurs if the probability that A is chosen falls when C is in the choice set. Such a result is 
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incompatible with consistent preferences if those preferences are convex, because by 
convexity someone who prefers A to B will also prefer A to C.  
3. Asymmetric Dominance. In asymmetric dominance two goods, A and B are the focus of 
the experiment. In one treatment there is a choice from the set {A,B}. In the second 
treatment there is an additional option, D. D is the decoy good – a commodity that is 
inferior to one of the main goods (but not necessarily the other), in the sense that for 
anyone whose preferences satisfy strict monotonicity one good is preferable to the other. 
This good is the ‘target’. According to standard theory the presence of the decoy should 
not affect the proportion choosing the target; according to many researchers, the 
proportion choosing the target is higher in the presence of the decoy.  Following Huber, 
Payne and Puto, 1982, evidence for asymmetric dominance effects has become 
widespread in the experimental and consumer research literature, environmental valuation 
(Bateman et al, 2008) and even in studies of animal behaviour (Shafir et al, 2002). For 
instance Simonson and Tversky (1992) examined choices between receiving $6 and a 
Cross pen (a US branded pen) and found that including a less attractive pen in the choice 
raised the percentage of subjects choosing the Cross pen from 36 to 46%. Asymmetric 
dominance has also been observed in field experiments, most notably in the work of 
Doyle et al. (1999), who used tins of baked beans in a supermarket and found that 
offering a decoy (in the shape of the half-size tin of one brand at the same price as the 
full-size tin) raised market share of the target from 19% to 33%. 
4.  ‘More is less’ preference reversal. Consider two goods, A and A’. A’ is the same as A 
plus a small item which valued separately would have positive value. Compared to A the 
additional item is of low value. Given a straight choice, A’ is chosen over A. In early 
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work involving hypothetical choices, Hsee (1998) reports average willingness to pay of  
$24 for a dictionary with 10,000 words when subjects were valuing that dictionary alone, 
but $5 less if they simultaneously asked to value a dictionary of 20,000 words. In Slovic 
et al’s 2002  pioneering study, the goods are lotteries and A is created from A’ by adding 
a small probability of a negative outcome. Again, though people valued A over A’. One 
interpretation of the results is that, with goods of uncertain value the added bit provides a 
signal that the rest of the good is not worth much. In a widely-cited field experiment 
involving graded baseball cards, List, 2002, finds that individuals place a higher value on 
the bundle A compared to bundle A’.  
 
These four anomalies can be summarised through the device of Figure 1 which shows 
goods or bundles of goods differing along two dimensions, x and y.   
 
A’ 
A 
D 
B y 
C 
x 
Figure 1. A Summary of Four Choice Set Anomalies 
1. With the endowment effect A is preferred to B out of the choice set {A,B} when A is the 
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endowment, but B is preferred when B is the endowment. 
2. With the compromise effect, A is preferred to B when C is absent and the choice set is 
{A,B}, but B is preferred to A when the choice set is {A, B, C}. 
3. With the asymmetric decoy effect, B is preferred to A when D is absent and the choice set 
is {A,B}, but A is preferred to B when D is present and the choice set is therefore {A, B, 
D}. 
4. With the ‘more is less’ phenomenon A is preferred to B, when the choice set is {A, B}, 
but B is preferred to A’ when the set is {A’,B}. 
These four anomalies are well-documented, but in specific instances, with particular goods or 
parameters, sometimes reported behaviour does not deviate from the null hypothesis of rational 
choice. For instance, Morrison, 1997 finds an endowment effect with mugs but not with 
chocolate. We therefore run parallel experiments with individual participants and with students so 
that we could make a firmer comparison between the behaviour of individuals and couples.  
 
3. Method. 
Individuals and couples were recruited through flyers, email and word of mouth from the 
communities living around Egham and Englefield Green, small commuter towns on the fringes of 
London, UK.   In the adverts we simply stated that we wished to recruit couples (or individuals) 
to understand decision-making and made it clear that participants would expect to receive prizes 
for participation. We also set up stalls at a Christmas party run by the Parent-Teachers 
Association (PTA) at a local village school, offering similar information to couples and 
individuals passing by our room. For couples and individual subjects in these groups, we asked 
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that participants be over 21.6 Additionally couples had to be living with a partner that they had 
been with for over one year. For the student experiment, we used all the members of a 2nd year 
economics undergraduate class at Royal Holloway, University of London (which is based in 
Egham). 
The non-student experiments discussed here have the same basic format. Subjects were 
given a brief one-to-one introduction from one of the experimenters and then led through the 
written instructions and examples at the front of the printed questionnaire. The questionnaire also 
included descriptions of the goods and details of the incentive mechanism. Subjects were then 
invited to make a series of choices in their own time. After completing the main part of the 
questionnaire, all participants filled in a brief demographics questionnaire. A random lottery 
procedure (bingo chips drawn from a bag) was then used to select the question that was to be for 
real. The subjects’ answers determined their prize, for which they signed a receipt.  
For the endowment effect, we added the following to the basic design. Once subjects were 
seated they were randomly allocated one of the two endowments and told that this was theirs to 
keep. At the end of the experiment once the random lottery had been executed we showed them 
the alternative endowment and invited them to swap their initial endowment for the alternative. If 
they chose to do so, the prizes were swapped. Otherwise they left the venue with their original 
 
6 Although individuals and couples were drawn from the same population we did not attempt to 
randomly allocate subjects to the individual or couples treatment. Our reasons are pragmatic: as 
other researchers have found (e.g. Corfman et al, 1987 or Bateman and Munro, 2005), 
recruitment of couples is slow, costly in terms of effort and rarely results in large samples. Much 
of the trouble arises from the need to get often busy people with two jobs and children, into the 
same room at the same time. Thus when a couple indicated that they were available we used them 
in the couples version of the experiment. 
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endowment. This offer was a surprise: they were not told that they would have the opportunity to 
swap until they had completed all parts of the rest of the experiment. 
For the student sessions the basic format was similar to the above. The first key difference 
was that not everyone won a prize. Instead students were issued with raffle tickets and 9 winners 
were chosen publicly. Thereafter we used the random lottery to determine their individual prizes. 
The second difference was that the experiment was conducted in a large group (a lecture). For 
this group we produced two versions of the questionnaire and distributed them randomly. In one 
version of the questionnaire subjects were told that they would win endowment A and in the other 
version they were told they would win endowment B. In both versions, at the end of the 
questionnaire (several pages later) they were invited to swap their endowment for the alternative, 
both of which were present in the lecture hall. To sum up therefore, this version of the experiment 
was incentivized, but more weakly than other sessions. This made it closer to the classical, 
hypothetical student-subject style experiment that was the origin of many famous anomalous 
results (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
We used a variety of goods, most of which would have been familiar (at least in outline) 
to the participants. The cheaper food products used in the questions (handmade chocolates and 
mince pies7) were taken to the experiment sessions. The other prizes were delivered to homes (or 
office addresses) of participants in the week after the experiment. We used suppliers such as 
Amazon or Oddbins (a wine merchant) that would be familiar to and trusted by the participants. 
For the food gifts, we used a local grocery store, which was also the source of the endowment 
 
7 Mince pies contain (minced) candied fruit rather than meat. They are a traditional Christmas 
food in the UK.  
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effect goods. This grocery store, located in the nearby Windsor royal estates is well-known in the 
area for high quality and typically organic products. For the asymmetric dominance question we 
used a branded juicer (retail value approximately £50), the juicer plus a £5 department store 
voucher, and a £35 shoe store voucher. For the ‘more is less’ preference reversal we used 
selections of luxury grocery products, including wine, honey and biscuits. We labelled these as 
hampers. Total retail value was around £45. 
Most of the data reported below uses this basic design. For the couples and individuals 
our sample sizes are quite small. So, for some of the issues we use additional data from two 
related experiments run on couples (Munro, McNally and Popov, 2008). The locality and 
sampled population (local community events including church services, a fair run by Royal 
Holloway and a heritage open day, also run by the college in which the older college buildings 
were made open to the public) for these experiments was almost identical. Many of the questions 
are the same and the payment procedures were the same, but the format differed. In one of the 
ancillary experiments the endowment effect test procedure was omitted. In the second ancillary 
experiment we were mostly interested in the difference between individual and joint decision-
making within households so most of the questions were seen and answered twice: first 
separately and then jointly.  Because of this important difference, we use data from that 
experiment cautiously – to try to see if sample sizes determine our results. In fact the ancillary 
data does not turn insignificant hypotheses into significant8. 
 
 
 
8 This may look selective, so it is worth adding that where we have the data available, it does not 
turn significant results into insignificant. 
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4. Results 
We have 133 economics students in our core sample, 31 couples and 30 individuals. The 
experiment lasted about 10 minutes per couple and the average cost of the prizes was just under 
£28 (around US$44). All the couples were in heterosexual relationships and mean ages were 43.5 
(for men) and 36.4 for women. The couples had an average of 1.7 children and had been together 
for around 16.5 years while 66% were married.  For the individuals, 88% were married and they 
had been with their partner for 19.7 years on average. They typically had 1.56 children and were 
slightly older than the couples (48 for men and 38 for women).  Fifteen individuals were men. 
None of the differences between the couples and individuals sub-sample were significant which 
reflects the large variance in ages and time together. The oldest person in the samples was 81 and 
the largest number of years together was 50.9 For the students the variation in ages was much 
smaller. Mean age for this group was 20.2 for men and 20.0 for women. Out of the 133, 72 were 
male and nearly all were Economics majors.  
We take each of the effects in turn.  
 
Compromise effects.  
To test for the compromise effect we had three goods: 6 bottles of wine, USB memory 
sticks and MP3 players. The retail value of the wine was about £30; the USB sticks sold for 
around £10 and the MP3 players could be bought for £20-25. None of this price information was 
given to participants. The USB and MP3 player questions were ‘classical’ compromise effect 
                                                 
9 We do not report demographic details of the ancillary data here, except to say that it was very 
similar. 
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questions in which the goods were introduced and quantitative details of their characteristics were 
presented to the subjects. There were 4 characteristics for the USB drive and five for the MP3 
players. Figure 2 shows a three option question for the USB drives (see Appendix for the other 
goods). For the wine the only relevant characteristic was the proportion of bottles that were red or 
white.  In all cases we presented subjects with either two or three choices. The two options A and 
B were chosen such that the B was a compromise between A and the third option, C.  With the 
USB and MP3 players, for couples and individuals, subjects saw both the 3 option and the 2 
option question. For the students, we had a between subjects design in which each participant saw 
only one of the variants for each good.  
A Choice Question. These USB Pen drives have 1Gb storage (about 1, 000 good 
quality photos) and they are from well-known manufacturers. The read speed 
information tells you roughly how long it takes to read all the information off a full drive. 
The write speed information tells you roughly how long it takes to fill the drive when 
copying files from your computer.  
 USB Pen Drive 1 
 
 USB Pen Drive 2 
 
 USB Pen Drive 3
 
Length  6cm  7cm  7.3cm 
Weight 7g  7.5g  10g 
Write speed 4 minutes 10 
seconds 
 3 minutes 20 
seconds 
 2 minutes 47 
seconds 
Read speed 1 minute 40 
seconds 
 2 minutes 23 
seconds 
 2 minutes 47 
seconds 
 
We prefer          
 
Figure 2 USB drive question with 3 options. 
For all 3 goods the hypothesis tested was: 
H0:  Proportion choosing option 1 is unaffected by the presence of option 3. 
H1:  Proportion choosing option 1 is smaller when option 3 is present. 
Table 2 shows the results for the USB drives. We can see that there is a significant 
departure from the null hypothesis for two groups. In the case of students the difference is 
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significant at the 1% level; for the couples the difference is significant at the 5% level. For 
individuals there is some switching away from option 1, but it is not significant. 
 
Table 2. Testing for a Compromise Effect with USB pen drives. 
 Students Couples Individuals 
% choosing option 1, 2 
options available 
69.1 48.4 63.3 
% choosing option 1, 3 
options available 
33.8 29.4 56.7 
Test Between subjects,  
Fisher’s exact 
Within subjects 
McNemar 
Within subjects 
McNemar 
Sample size 133 31 30 
P value for null hypothesis 0.000 0.038 0.342 
 
Our results for MP3 players are very similar as figure 3 shows. Using the same 
statistical tests as for USB drives, we get a p-value for the null hypothesis of 0.003 for 
students, 0.02 for couples and 0.180 for individuals. So, both couples and students show 
strong evidence for compromise effects, but individuals do not 
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Figure 3. Compromise and MP3 players. 
Our final compromise question uses wine. The three goods are 6 bottles of red wine, 6 
bottles of white wine and a mix of 3 bottles of red and 3 bottles of white from a popular and 
trusted mid-range supplier. The last option is clearly a compromise between the first two. It 
differs from the other questions however, in that the value of the different attributes (red and 
white) is probably clearer to most participants compared to the technical data provided from 
the technology products. Moreover there is only one dimension to consider. Our sample here 
differs slightly from the electronic goods. For students it is the same group of people and the 
same between subjects design. For couples and individuals we have a between subjects design 
here. With only 30 or so subjects in each group in the main experiment, that obviously makes 
the sample size small. But we also asked the wine question as part of another experiment and 
we pool the ancillary data. The boosted sample size does not change the results which are 
clearly non-significant (see Table 3 below). 
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Table 3. Testing for a Compromise Effect with Wine. 
 Students Couples Individuals 
% choosing all Red, 2 options 
available 
25.0 26.7 20.0 
% choosing all Red, 3 options 
available 
12.5 25.6 28.6 
Test Between subjects, 
Fisher’s exact 
Between subjects,  
Fisher’s exact 
Between 
subjects,  
Fisher’s exact 
Sample size 132 69 29 
P value for null hypothesis 0.050 0.560 0.834 
Note: 1 couple, 1 student and 1 individual did not answer this question for personal reasons. 
 
 
Asymmetric Decoy.  
The three goods were as follows: A voucher with a face value of £40 that can be 
exchanged for theatre tickets at a large number of locations across the UK; an electric juicing 
machine and the same juicer plus a £5 gift voucher for a leading UK department store (which was 
named in the experiment). In this context, the dominated decoy is the electric juicer machine 
without the department store gift certificate. Domination was obvious and no-one chose the 
dominated outcome. The concept of an electric juicer is well-known, but it is unlikely that many 
people in our sample would be well-acquainted with all the various types available and typical 
prices.  
The hypothesis to be tested was: 
 
H0:  the proportion choosing the voucher is unaffected by the presence of the decoy 
H1:  the proportion choosing the voucher is lower when the decoy is present. 
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Results are summarised in Table 4 which incorporates some data from other experiments.  
 
Table 4. Testing for an Asymmetric Decoy Effect. 
 Students Couples Individuals 
% choosing Theatre voucher, no 
decoy 
63.3 58.3 42.8 
% choosing Theatre voucher, 
decoy present 
58.5 46.7 56.7 
Test Between subjects, 
Fisher’s exact 
Between subjects,  
Fisher’s exact 
Between 
subjects,  
Fisher’s exact 
Sample size 132 69 44 
P value for null hypothesis 0.350 0.251 0.880 
 
For the students, though the pattern of choices is consistent with a decoy effect, there is 
nothing strong enough to produce statistical significance. The conclusion is the same for the 
couples. For the individual subjects, the difference between treatments is also not significant and 
in fact runs in the opposite direction. These results are not materially altered by confining the data 
set to the main experiment. Our conclusion is that there is not much evidence of any asymmetric 
decoy effect in this example. Possibly the near –cash nature of the department store voucher did 
not create a decoy effect, but the key point is the equivalence in behaviour between couples and 
other subjects.                                                  
 
 
 
Testing for an endowment effect.  
Recall that to test for the endowment effect we used two goods: a box of six luxury mince 
pies and a small pack of handmade chocolates. Unlike the other goods we took the mince pies 
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and chocolates to the experiments. They were both on show throughout the experiment and 
subjects were able to examine the alternatives before making up their minds. For the students the 
endowment was contingent, in the sense that each participant knew what his or her endowment 
would be if they were one of the randomly selected winners. For the couples and individuals the 
endowment was actually given to the participants at the start of the experiment.  
 
The null and alternative hypotheses are,  
 
H0: the proportion who prefer Chocolates is independent of endowment. 
H1: the proportion preferring Chocolates is larger when it is the endowment. 
Results are summarised in Table 5.  
 
 
Table 5. Testing for an Endowment Effect. 
 Students Couples Individuals 
% choosing chocolate given 
chocolate endowment 
86.7 53.8 73.3 
% choosing chocolate given 
mince pies endowment 
46.1 14.3 30.7 
Test Between subjects,  
Fisher’s exact 
Between subjects,  
Fisher’s exact 
Between 
subjects,  
Fisher’s exact 
Sample size 133 31 30 
P value for null hypothesis 0.000 0.037 0.029 
 
 
Although the percentages choosing the chocolates differ between groups the effect of 
endowment is consistent: for students, couples and individuals we find a significant (p < 0.05) 
endowment effect. 
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More is less  
 
For the test we have a question involving a choice between two bundles of products from 
a local luxury foods retailer. In bundle A we offer 3 bottles of red wine. In bundle B, there is one 
bottle of white wine plus an assortment of other products including honey and marmalade. The 
total price (not revealed to participants) of the bundles was similar. To make bundle A’ we added 
a small pack of organic shortbread fingers worth around £2.75. The notion here is that the actual 
value of the bundles, particularly the wine, would normally be unknown to the subjects. The 
presence of the shortbread might signal that the red wine was not that valuable and hence lead to 
the ‘more is less’ effect. To save some time, this question was not faced by the student subjects. 
The results are shown in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. Testing for ‘More is less’ 
 Couples Individuals 
% choosing A from {A,B} 45.8 70.3 
% choosing A’ from {A’,B} 40.0 60 
Test Between subjects,  
Fisher’s exact 
Between subjects,  
Fisher’s exact 
Sample size 31 30 
P value for null hypothesis 0.44 0.40 
 
As can be seen there is no statistically significant evidence of an effect. We also elicited selling 
prices for the A and A’ Hampers, by asking subject to state whether they would sell the hamper at 
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a series of prices that rose from £1 to £20 in £1 increments. We told each subject that if this 
question was selected by the random lottery, then they would face a second random lottery to 
determine which price would apply. If the price was such that they were not willing to sell, then 
they would receive the hamper. Otherwise we would pay them in cash at the end of the 
experiment. When we test the null of no difference in median selling prices, Fisher’s exact test 
provides a p-value of 0.26 for the couples and 0.56 for individuals. Thus again we find no 
evidence for less-is-more. Finally, in our earlier experiments we had another less-is-more 
between-groups comparison: subjects chose between a £35 Theatre voucher and a juicer (A). In 
one treatment, we added a £5 store voucher to the juicer to create bundle A’. Out of 56 subjects, 
22 chose option A’ rather than option B, while out of 34 subjects just 8 chose option A over 
option B. Thus ‘more is more’ within this group and we obtain a p-value for the null (against a 
one-way alternative) of 0.963 using a Fisher’s exact test.  
 
 
5. Discussion. 
A summary of the main results can be found in Table 7.  
 
 
Table 7. A summary of the results. 
 Endowment Compromise Effect Asymmetric 
Dominance 
More is less 
Group Chocolate/ 
Mince pies 
Wine USB MP3 Juicer Hamper 
choice
Hamper 
selling price 
Juicer 
Students Yes Yes Yes Yes No - - - 
Individual
s 
Yes No No No No No No - 
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Couples Yes No Yes Yes No No No No 
 
In this experiment we have searched for evidence of the kinds of anomalies often found in 
individual choice. We use established couples while individuals and economics students 
providing points of comparison. We find no evidence of a ‘more is less’ effect with our subjects; 
nor do we find any evidence of asymmetric dominance in any of the three groups. For the 
compromise effect we find clear evidence in couples and students but no effects that are 
significant at the 95% level within individuals. For a simple test of the endowment effect we 
obtain significant departures from the null hypothesis for all the three groups of subjects.  
Our focus in the paper is on the behaviour of couples, but it is worthwhile pausing and 
noting the absence of significant effects for asymmetric dominance and ‘more is less’ for our 
subjects. Of course, according to standard theory we should expect this absence, so perhaps our 
results do not require clarification. When monotonicity has previously been rejected, it has 
typically been the case that the goods being value are unfamiliar. In this situation, the extra added 
to bundle A to create A’ can act as a signal of the quality of A. If this signal is sufficiently 
negative, then more can appear to be worth less. Such effects are likely to be sensitive to both the 
size of the increment, to the nuances of signalling and to the sensitivity of consumers to changes 
in perceived quality. Perhaps in List’s case, trading card collectors were highly attuned to issues 
of quality.  Meanwhile, when asymmetric dominance decoy effects have been found it is usually 
the case that decoy shares the same characteristics as the target. For instance, in Doyle et al, 
1999, the decoy was simply a smaller tin of beans priced at the same level as the large tin. This 
makes comparison between decoy and target relatively straightforward and helps emphasise the 
‘bargain’ nature of the target. In our case the difference between the target and decoy was a 
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voucher which had different characteristics to the target. Perhaps this just emphasised the 
irrelevant nature of the decoy.  
Whatever the interpretation of the non-significant results, the salient feature of our data is 
that couples behave in a similar manner to individuals: there is no evidence that two heads may 
be better than one, when it comes to consumer choice and there is no evidence that two heads are 
worse either. Rather, when choosing as a couple, partners exhibit the same patterns of anomalies 
that are shown by individuals. Earlier results on tests of expected utility theory in Bateman and 
Munro, 2005, can be read in the same way: couples and individuals deviate from standard theory 
in similar ways. If we take all these results at face value a number of consequences follow. First, 
in terms of the motivation for this paper, it appears that there is evidence for the missing link 
between experiments on individuals and tests in the wild for anomalies that employ household 
data. Secondly, given that in decision tasks where there is a right answer, groups appear to make 
fewer  errors compared to individuals, our results suggest that anomalies of the kind explored 
here are not driven by the kind of cognitive errors that lead to failures of Bayesian reasoning.10 
We have stressed that in a first-step, portmanteau experiment such as this one, not all 
questions can be answered about the existence of anomalies in the decisions made by couples. 
We have not for instance, ruled out the existence of asymmetric dominance decoy effects or the 
‘more is less’ preference reversal with couples in other situations. Moreover, there may be other 
anomalies where one can find differences between couples and individuals. Given that in many 
countries (e.g. the USA, UK or Japan) fewer than 1 in 3 adults live in households without adults, 
 
10 There is a need for caution here, because in principle, anomalies in individuals and couples 
could be driven by different processes. E.g. the compromise effect might indeed be a cognitive 
error in individuals, but a result of bargaining protocols in couples.  
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there is need for further experimental research on the economic behaviour of groups in general 
and couples in particular.  
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Appendix A. Typical questions from the experiments. 
 
1. Compromise effect questions. 
 
A Choice Question. These USB Pen drives have 1Gb storage (about 1, 000 good 
quality photos) and they are from well-known manufacturers. The read speed 
information tells you roughly how long it takes to read all the information off a full drive. 
The write speed information tells you roughly how long it takes to fill the drive when 
copying files from your computer.  
 USB Pen Drive 1 
 
 USB Pen Drive 2 
 
 USB Pen Drive 3 
 
Length  6cm  7cm  7.3cm 
Weight 7g  7.5g  10g 
Write speed 4 minutes 10 
seconds 
 3 minutes 20 
seconds 
 2 minutes 47 
seconds 
Read speed 1 minute 40 
seconds 
 2 minutes 23 
seconds 
 2 minutes 47 
seconds 
 
We prefer          
 
 
 
 A case of 6 bottles 
of red wine from 
Oddbins 
 A mixed case of 3 
bottles of red wine 
and 3 bottles of white 
wine from Oddbins 
 
  A case of 6 bottles 
of white wine from 
Oddbins 
I prefer            
 
 
 
A Choice Question. These MP3 players are all from respected 
manufacturers. The battery life information provides a guide to the running 
costs.  The capacity information provides a guide to how many songs can 
be stored.  
 MP3 Player 1 
 
MP3 Player 2 
 
 MP3 Player 3 
 
Battery life 9 hours 15 hours  16 hours 
Weight 55g 51g  44g 
Radio/Video Radio + Video Radio  - 
Capacity 512 Mb 512 Mb  1 Gb 
Warranty 1 year 1 year  1 year 
 
I prefer          
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2. Endowment effect question. 
You were given a selection of 6 Luxury chocolates from the Windsor Farm Shop as a reward for 
taking part. Would you prefer to keep them or would you prefer to swap them for the mince pies?  
Keep  Swap 
 
3. More is less question (the item highlighted here in bold represents the ‘more’ element). 
 Hamper 1 
3 bottles of red wine (Pinot Noir) 
pack of Windsor shortbread 
fingers 
 
 Hamper 2 
1 bottle of White wine (Flint Dry) 
Organic Biscuit selection (box) 
Duchy organic Heather Honey 
Old English chutney 
English marmalade 
 
We prefer        
 
4. Asymmetric Dominance question. 
1.  Cookworks Signature  
whole fruit juicer  
A Cookworks Signature whole 
fruit juicer + £5 Marks and 
Spencer Voucher 
A £35 Theatre 
Voucher 
I prefer           
 
 
 
 
 
